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Abstract. Proving the properties of a program which must execute on a distributed system whose 
nodes may fail is a complex task. Such proofs must take into account the effects of hardware 
failures at all possible points in the execution of individual processes. The difliculty in accomplish- 
ing this is compounded by the need to cater also for the simultaneous failure of two or more 
processing nodes. In this paper, WC consider programs written in a version of Hoarc’s CSP and 
dctinc a set of axioms and infcrcncc rules by which proofs can be constructed in three steps: 
proving the properties of each process when its communicants are prone to failure. establishing 
the ctiects of failure of each process. and combining thcsc two steps to dctcrminc the fault tolerant 
properties of the whole program. The proof system is thus compositional, in the sense that proofs 
can be constructed in a modular way. 
1. Introduction 
In some earlier work [3.4]. we had studied the problem of proving the properties 
of distributed programs which execute on hardware that may fail. For a restricted 
class of programs, and for some kinds of hardware failures, it was shown that the 
properties of such programs can be proved and that these proofs can be used to 
restructure programs for improved resilience to hardware failures. Programs were 
written in a slightly extended version of CSP [2] and the proof system of Apt, 
France2 and de Roever [ l] was used under the assumption that failures in a processor 
or in a communication channel could be detected, and that recovery could be 
initiated by Ye-making’ the process, causing it to ‘repair’ its channels and resume 
execution from its initial state. In general, recovery required the cooperative action 
of several processes. 
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As earlier, we are more concerned with proof techniques for fault tolerant 
programs than with the wide variety of faults that may in practice occur. Briefly, 
the ‘faults’ we are concerned with in this paper are those that can be attributed to 
hardware failures, and we call a program ‘fault tolerant’ if it can be proved to 
produce correct behaviour in spite of the occurrence of such failures. A necessary 
prerequisite for this is to assume that hardware failures are detected, and it is well 
known that this is not always possible. To simplify the discussion, we shall only 
consider certain kinds of hardware failures: for example, we shall assume that 
communication between processes is reliable and that failures are not malicious. 
When we refer to a process ‘failing’, we shall mean that it has been subject to a 
detected hardware failure; ‘recovery’ of a process will mean restarting its execution 
from some previous state. In fact, we shall assume that processes resume execution 
from their initial state, since that is most easily possible. In general, we have chosen 
to make very simple assumptions about hardware failures so that attention can be 
concentrated on proof techniques for fault tolerant programs. 
Apart from their use in proving properties of fault tolerant programs, local and 
global invariants can be analyzed to provide guidelines for constructing fault tolerant 
versions of correct distributed programs [4]. Such guidelines are quite useful for 
simple programs, but we have found that they do not always provide enough 
information to help in constructing larger and more complex fault tolerant programs. 
Informally, we can say that local and global invariants allow characterization of 
the ‘low level’ bchaviour of a program and that this is somctimcs inadequate when 
‘high level properties of a fault tolerant program must be established; for example 
a global invariant provides links between communication commands in pairs of 
proccsscs but it is dillicult to USC it to both represent the eliects of failure in one 
process on other processes and account for the simultaneous failure of more than 
one process. 
Consider a program S, in which process R, sends process R2 an ascending 
sequence of integers and R, sums successive pairs of integers and sends the results 
to process R, to be printed: 
S,::[R,::i:=l;*[(LI(R,)}R,!i+i:=i+l] 
RL:: R,‘!x;*[(Lf(R1)}R,?y~R,!(.~+y); R,?.K] 
II 
R ,::*[(LI(R3)}Rz?r+“print r”] 
1 
Assume process R2 fails (and recovers) and that the fact that this failure has occurred 
is registered by R,. What actions are then possible for R, so that the program 
overcomes the eflect of the failure? If R, registers the failure when i > 2 and i is 
even, the local invariants LI( R,), LI( RZ) and LI( R,) and a suitable global invariant 
will permit the inference that the sum of the two integers (i - 3) and (i - 2) has been 
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sent by R2 to R,. But if the value of i is odd, no assertion can be made about 
whether R2 failed after or before it communicated the new sum to R3. In a fault 
tolerant version of the program, R, must then assume the worst and decrement i 
by 2 before re-sending values to R2. And this can lead to the same value being 
printed twice (or more often, if there are repeated failures in R2). Unfortunately, 
even with as few as three processes, the reasoning that leads to this conclusion must 
be based on properties of the whole program and the assertion describing this 
condition is no longer simple. It can easily be seen that the situation can get rapidly 
out of hand as the complexity of each process and/or the number of processes 
increases. 
If R3 is modified to print only those values received from R2 that are in strictly 
ascending order, such repetitions can be avoided. But if R2 and R, fail simul- 
taneously, i.e. within the same interval of time, it can no longer be assured that 
values are printed in this order and we must accept a weaker global invariant that 
admits the possibility of repetitions. In general, in all such cases we must either 
rely on the intuition of the programmer in specifying these effects and their combina- 
tions correctly, or look for a methodology by which the effects can be systematically 
derived. Even a limited acquaintance with the construction of fault tolerant programs 
will show that intuition, by itself, is not suflicient: we have found building such 
programs and proving their propertics to be an extremely complex task unless it is 
supported by a sound methodology. 
We have thcrcfore been investigating other techniques for constructing fault 
tolerant programs. A more promising approach than dealing with the program as 
a whole would be to dccomposc the main problem into the sub-problems of: 
(a) Obtaining the bchaviour of each process F’, allowing for frrilurcs (and sub- 
sequent rccovcries) of its communicants; however, in this step, we do nof consider 
failures of the process f’, itself. 
(b) Obtaining, from (a), the behaviour of P,, now allowing for its own failures. 
Notation: We shall denote by P, the execution of the ith process without any 
failures, and, by [P,] the execution of the same process in the presence of failures. 
Thus, in Step (a) we obtain the behaviour of P,, and in (b) we obtain the behaviour 
of [P,] from that of P,. 
(c) Combining the behaviours of [ P,], i = 1,. . . , n, to obtain the behaviour of the 
program as a whole. 
Steps (a) and (b) can then be performed locally (i.e., in isolation) for each process 
and Step (c) requires the use of proof rules for communication between processes. 
Steps (a), (b) and (c) are handled in Sections 5, 6 and 7 respectively. It should be 
noted that the properties of the same process with and without failures can be rather 
difTerent and this should emerge from the application of Step (b), rather than from 
informal reasoning by the programmer. 
The CSP proof system of Soundararajan [S] follows similar steps in reasoning 
about programs: properties of individual processes are proved in isolation and then 
combined by a rule of parallel composition where the post-condition ofthe individual 
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processes, along with the requirement of mutual compatibility between the record 
of the sequences of communication of the various processes, allows us to draw 
appropriate conclusions about the whole CSP program. We shall extend the axioms 
and inference rules of this proof system for our purposes, adding clauses to account 
for detected failures, and then prove the fault tolerant properties of a simple program. 
Our model of fault tolerant programs is rather simple: we do not, for instance, 
consider the possibility of malicious behaviour. The purpose of this paper is not so 
much to propose an elaborate model of fault tolerant programs that includes all of 
the problems that might arise in real programs, as to present an axiomatic approach 
that may be used for analysing fault tolerant programs. Naturally, the approach 
can be extended to deal with more general classes of fault tolerant programs than 
those considered here. 
2. A system model 
Assume every process in a CSP program executes on a separate processing node 
and that the nodes are interconnected by a communication medium. A processing 
node has some private memory, inaccessible to other nodes, and two or more 
processors which scparatcly execute the code for the process and deposit the results 
in this memory. A fault occurs in a node when there is some hardware failure in a 
processor: it is assumed that this can be detected as a discrepancy between the 
actions of the processors at the node. Thcsc are the only faults considered and it is 
assumed that thcrc are no communication failures. In general, WC shall not consider 
conspiracies and malicious failures. though some of the assumptions we make arc 
valid only if appropriate solutions are used for such failures [6]. 
When there arc two processors in a node, the hardware faults we consider can 
be detected by ‘matching’ circuits; if there are three or more processors, simple 
majority logic can be used. A node with these properties is very similar to the 
‘failstop’ processors of Schlichting and Schneider [7] which perform a consistency 
check after each instruction and stop when a hardware error is detected. However, 
for our purposes, the processors need not execute in step as it is only necessary 
that they synchronize at selection points (so that all the processors make the same 
choice) and that faults be checked for periodically and before any communication 
takes place with another node. When a fault is detected in a node, execution of the 
resident process must cease and the node fails to respond to any communication 
requests. A failed node (and its resident process) is said to be withdrawn. 
We can summarize the assumptions made thus far as follows: 
Assumption I. There are no faults in the communication pathways between proces- 
ses: a message sent correctly will be received correctly some finite time later and 
two successive messages sent from one process to another will be received in the 
order that they were sent. 
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Assumption 2. All hardware faults in a node are detected and cause execution of 
the node to stop before further communication takes place with any other node. 
Assumption 3. A process on a fault free node which attempts to communicate with 
another process on a withdrawn node will receive an error signal, so failure of a 
node can be detected by attempts at communication from other nodes. 
Without making any further assumptions about the communication patterns in the 
program (as were made, for example, in [3]), these assumptions are suhicient to 
guarantee detection of each node failure if no more than one node fails within the 
time required for this failure to be detected by some other node. But there are 
several reasons why this is an unreasonable constraint. For example, we shall wish 
to make assertions about the final values of the variables of a process, and that is 
only possible if the process has not failed after its last communication. And for 
arbitrary communications graphs, or multiple simultaneous failures, some more 
assumptions are in any case needed. Since any of the processes of a program may 
suffer as a result of a node failure, assume there is a separate communication checker 
process whose function is to detect all node failures. 
Assumption 4. A communication checker process P,, executes on a separate node 
and regularly interrogates each node and detects a failure by the lack of a response. 
The communication checker has an additional function: when it detects a failure 
of a node, it ‘re-makes’ the process and the process resumes execution from its 
initial state; if more than one initial state is possible then it resumes in any of those 
initial states. (It is possible that the process re-starts execution on a new node- 
assuming adequate hardware redundancy. In this case, PO will also have to maintain 
a table indicating the process running on each node, and which nodes are ‘up’ and 
free.) When a process 4 is re-made, any attempt by another process P, at communica- 
tion with P, will result in P, first receiving a message to the effect that 6 has failed 
and recovered (been re-made) since their last communication, so that P, can, perhaps, 
resend some of the information that it had previously sent to P,. (In our system 
model, P, would then need to discover the identity of the new node at which 5 is 
running; being an implementation detail, this will be transparent to the programmer, 
and will not be explicitly represented in our axiomatics.) To complete the model, 
we must assume that there are a number of communication checkers (one master 
and several standbys, for example) each in communication with the others so that 
failure of a communication checker does not compromise the reliability of the whole 
system. 
Assumption 5. At least one communication checker is executing correctly at all times. 
It must be emphasized that the system model outlined here has been kept as 
simple as possible because the purpose of this paper is really to construct proof 
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techniques that can be used to examine the effects of hardware failures on distributed 
programs. Nevertheless, it is useful to know that a number of practical implementa- 
tions of such a model are possible, e.g. on a shared memory system, or on a local 
area network where the communication interface of each node stores the identity 
of the process executing at the node. A generous amount of hardware redundancy 
is needed, but its actual extent will depend on the degree of failure resilience required. 
3. Fault detection and recovery 
We extend the communication statements of CSP to allow us to deal with failures. 
Using the symbol ‘.’ to mean either input (‘?‘) or output (‘!‘), a statement in process 
PI to communicate with process Pi appears as 
Pi . x(( S’)) 
and in a guarded command as 
h; Pi . x + S(( S’)) (2) 
where 6 is a boolean expression. 
As in CSP, a communication command such as Pi. x may be selected for execution 
in two ways: dcterministically, as in (I), and non-deterministically (subject to h 
evaluating to true), as in (2). When such a statement is selected for execution in a 
correct program, there are two possibilities: 
(a) Process Pi may be ready to reciprocate the communication, and the command 
PG. x is executed; 
(b) Process Pi may have failed since it last communicated with P;. and the 
statement ((S’)) is executed: if Pi is still in a failed state, it is implicitly re-made 
before S’ is executed. 
Note that exactly one of these possibilities will be selected: either Pi * x is correctly 
executed, or ((57)) is executed. In our further discussion, we shall call ((S’)) the ‘fault’ 
alternative. To keep the control llow simple, we do not allow any communication 
statement to be included in a fault alternative. 
To illustrate the use of such statements, consider the following example of the 
well-known bounded butler. A producer process Pi sends a sequence of numbered 
lines to a process Pi with a buffer of size n. The butler process in turn sends a 
sequence of lines to the consumer process PI, which sends each line to a printer 
process Pi: 
s2 :: [P; 11 P;ll P;ll Pi] 
P; :: p.req : integer; ready : boolean; nexfline : line; 
pseq := 0; ready := false; 
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* [iready + nexfline := Linefpseq + 1); ready+ := true 
0 
ready; Pi ! ( ne.xtline, pseq + 1) + pseq := pseq + 1; ready := fulse 
Pi :: in, auf : integer; 
A : [0 . . (n - l)] of record In : line; linenurn : integer end; 
in := 0; out := 0; 
*[in<oul+n-11; P;?A[inmodn]+in:=in+l 
out < in; Pi ! A[ out mod n] + ouz := auf + 1 
1 
P; :: In : line; nzznz : integer; 
* [Pi ? In, n14m -+ P; ! In 
I 
I’: :: ffz : lint; 
*[P>:’ In + skip 
1 
Let us assume for simplicity that the producer process, Pi. and the printer process, 
PA, never fail. A failure in the buffer process, Pi, will be detected by Pi and P; 
and will cause the loss of (out - in) lines. As ozrf and in are local variables of Pi, 
it must then be assumed by Pi that up to n lines may be lost. Thus, a solution is 
for Pi to re-send these lines to Pi. If, in fact, (out - in) were less than n at the time 
of failure, this may lead to up to n repetitions in lines sent to P;. To suppress such 
duplicate lines, P; can be altered to forward to Pi only those lines that have numbers 
in strictly ascending order; e.g., if Iusrnum is the number of the last line printed, 
the next line to be printed must have nztrrz > hsrnum. Failure of P; will be detected 
by Pi and P; and may result in the loss of a line taken from Pi but not yet printed. 
Pi must therefore make provision for repeating the last line sent to Pi and, if this 
line had been printed, this will lead to a duplicated line. The last case to be considered 
is when Pi and P; fail within an interval of time such that the value of lustnum in 
Pi is lost and duplicate lines sent from Pi reach the printer. 
This informal analysis suggests that failure of Pi and Pj will, in general, lead to 
duplicated printing. The extent of such duplication depends on the points of failure, 
on the number of individual failures in Pi and Pi, and on the interaction between 
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the effects of failures in Pi and Pi. We shall later formally prove the fault tolerant 
properties of S,, which is a fault tolerant version of S,. 
s, :: [p,IIp44,IIpJ 
P, :: pseq, senr : integer; ready : boolean; nexrline : line; 
pseq := 0; sent := 0; ready := false; 
* [iready+ nextline := Line( pseq + 1); ready := true 
0 
ready; Pz ! (nextline, pseq + 1) + pseq := pseq + 1; readjp := false; 
sent := senf + 1 
((ready := false; 
[ sen I< n -, pseq := pseq - sent 
sent 3 II -, pxq := pseq - n 
1; sent := 0)) 
1 
Pz :: in, out : integer; output : boolean; 
A:[O..(n - I)] of record In : line; linenun : integer end; 
in := 0; out := 0; oulp~l := false; 
*[in<olrf+n-22; P,?A[inmodn]+in:=in+I 
cl 
oul < in; P, ! A[ out mod n] + o~rf := OUI + I; output := frue 
(([ oufpul + out := Olll - 1 
0 
loufpur + skip 
1; oufpur := false)) 
I 
P3 :: /n : line; num, lasrnum : integer; 
lastnum := 0; 
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*[Pz?ln,num-+[ num > lastnum + P4 ! In; lastnum := num 
0 
num s lastnum + skip 
1 
(Wp)) 
1 
P4 :: In : line; 
* [P, ? In + skip 
((skip)) 
1 
Note that the program takes into account the possibility of repeated failures of Pz 
and PJ at all points in their execution, including the cases where they fail more 
than once before engaging in any communication. 
4. Communication sequences 
Let every communication in an (extended) CSP program be characterized by a 
triple of the form (i, j, m), where i is an integer index for the sender process, j a 
similar index for the receiver process and m the communication (or message). Thus 
the communication resulting from the simultaneous execution of the statement I’, ! 5 
in process P, and P, ? x in process P, would be represented by the triple (I, 3,5). 
We shall refer to communications resulting from the execution of input and output 
commands as ‘explicit’ communications. 
‘Implicit communication takes place without the execution of input and output 
commands. There are two kinds of implicit communication and we shall characterize 
them by ‘messages’ received implicitly by a process: 
- 6 received by P,, when some process P, fails, 
- p received by a process when it attempts to communicate with a process that has 
failed and has been re-made since their last communication. 
But it must be emphasized that implicit communications do not necessarily 
represent the transmission of real messages from a sender to a receiver; in particular, 
the message ‘8’ originates from the detection of failure in a process by the communi- 
cation checker process P,, rather than from any action assumed to be taken by the 
failed process. When a process Pi fails (and is re-made) then before any other 
process P,, j # 0, can start communication with P,, P, must receive the message ‘p’. 
With every process Pi of a CSP program, we associate a communication sequence 
h, which consists of triples denoting communications sent or received by P,. Thus 
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the execution of the command P3 ! 5 in process P, and the command P, ? x in 
process P3 will result in two identical triples, both equal to (1,3, 5), being concate- 
nated to the communication sequences of P, and P,. A failure of a process P, (or 
rather the detection of P,‘s failure and its re-making by P,) is recorded as (i, 0, 6) 
in h,; and before any other process P, can communicate with P,, P, records (its 
observation of) this failure as (i, j, p). 
The following operations are defined over sequences: 
1111 is the length of the sequence h; for the empty sequence E the 
length is zero, 
h, A hz concates h, to the end of h,; we will also use ‘1’ to indicate 
concatenation of a sequence with an element and an element 
with a sequence. The usage will be clear from the context, 
tt ( i is the subsequence of all elements of h. which are of the form 
(i,j, m) or (j, i, m), 
Il[k] is the kth element of h from the beginning, 
/t(j:k] is the subsequence of h from its jth element to its kth element, 
It, c II, if for I c k c ]/I,], /I,[ k] = h,[k]. 
Much of this has been taken from Soundararajan [g], except for the introduction 
of implicit communications. We can therefore use the general form of the axioms 
and rules of infcrcnce defined there. with adaptations to deal with the extensions 
to CSI’ dcscrihed above. 
5. Axioms and rules of inference 
Hoare-style proof systems are characterized by triples of the form {p} S {q}, which 
are interpreted as saying that if the predicate p is true before the execution of S, 
then the predicate (1 will be true if and when execution of S is completed. Consider 
now the execution of the process PJ: 
Ps :: [ lnre + P, ! I; * [ rnre + skip] 
II 
true-r P6 ! 21 
Assume that in an execution of Ps, the first guarded command is chosen in the 
alternative statement so that 1 is output to P6 and Ps then loops in the repetitive 
command. When considering Ps’s normal execution (i.e. without faults), it would 
be correct to annotate Ps with the assertions 
14 = ~1 Ps {h, =U, 6,2))1 
because the post-condition is indeed valid for the only case when Ps does terminate; 
when Ps does not terminate, a partial-correctness proof system will allow any 
arbitrary post-condition to be asserted. 
That is not the case for the execution of f5 in an environment where faults may 
appear. Taking the execution of P5 described above, assume P5 fails when executing 
its repetitive command. When Ps is re-made, let its execution be such that this time 
the second guard is chosen. The sequence h, will then consist of 
((5.6, 1)(5,0, @(5,&B 
The post-condition for [PSI (where [PSI denotes fault prone execution of Ps) must 
thus be such that it is satisfied by any sequence of partial executions each ending 
in failure followed by recovery, followed by one ending in termination. 
Clearly then, it is not possible to obtain the post-condition of [P5] from the 
post-condition of P5 alone: we need also to know the communications that Ps can 
participate in along all paths, those that lead to normal termination (these will be 
the paths about which information will be available in the post-condition of P5), 
and those that do not. One possible solution is to have not only the post-condition 
ys of P5, but also the invariant r5 that its communication sequence h, will satisfy 
at all times during its execution. rs will then tell us what values h, may have at any 
point along the terminating and non-terminating execution paths of Ps. 
Given the invariant r5, and the post-condition qr of P5 (i.e. the failure free P5), 
it is indeed possible to obtain the post-condition of [P!] (i.e. the failure prone 
execution of f5) by noting that an execution of [P5] is, in fact, several partial 
executions of P5. each ending in failure, followed by a final complete execution of 
P.(. Hence the value of h, when an execution of [ PJ finishes will be the concatenation 
of the communication sequences corresponding to the partial executions and the 
linal complete cxccution of P5 (each separated from the next by (S, 0, 6) to record 
the failure and rccovcry of I’,). Each of these sequences will satisfy r.( (the final 
scqucnce will also satisfy y (-or rather the final scqucncc will have a value ‘allowed 
by’ y5, since y may refer not only to h5, but also to the other variables of P5). 
We use the following notation to describe the invariant and the post-condition 
(r) IPI s (41 
and to mean the following: if p and r are satisfied initially, then throughout the 
execution of statement S from P,, the sequence h, will satisfy r, and if and when S 
terminates, the predicate 9 will hold; r is a predicate over h, only, and does not 
refer to any other variables of P,. 
This extension of the standard Hoare notation is needed to derive the behaviour 
of [P,] from that of P,. In fact, once we have available the invariant r, and the 
post-condition 4, of P,, it becomes possible to obtain not only the post-condition 
4: of [P,], but also the invariant r: that h, satisfies during the execution of [ P,]; this 
is particularly useful for dealing with non-terminating processes, since for such 
processes the post-condition (usually ‘fal.~e’) does not really say anything about the 
behaviour. In summary, invariants are used to obtain the behaviour of the failure 
prone process from the behaviour of the failure free process; once invariants are 
present, they take on the additional role of characterizing non-terminating programs. 
(We shall return to non-terminating processes and programs in Section 8.) 
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We can now write down the rules of inference corresponding to the various 
statements that may appear in a process P, (i > 0); these rules will allow us to prove 
results of the kind 
(r,) {PJ p, 1%) 
about the failure free process P,. A final rule will then allow us to obtain the 
behaviour (expressed as) 
(r:) {Pa) Lpi1 (4:) 
of the failure prone execution [P,]. This rule will just be a formalization of the 
relation between P, and [P,] discussed in the last few paragraphs. 
Noration: In the rest of the paper, assertions with primes-e.g. r’, r;, . . . , q’, 
4;. . . .-will be associated with failure prone processes, and unprimed assertions 
with fault free processes. 
The following axioms and rules of inference refer to statements executed in a 
process Pi whose communication sequence is denoted by h,, i > 0. Notice that we 
do not define the communication checker process P, as it is assumed to be part of 
the underlying implementation. 
RI. Skip 
(r) IPI skip IpI 
R2. Output 
PJYLl*(iJ.clv 6-r 
(r) Ipl 5 !eIql 
R3. Input 
R4. Fault tolerant communication 
(r) {p} C, {q} where C, is either c ? x or 4 ! e 
P * Y 1:: -(J.i.P) 
(r) {cl11 S IsI 
cr) {p} cJts)) {q} 
R5. Assignment 
(r) Ip3 x:= e IPI 
R6. Composition 
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R7. Alternative command 
(r) Ip A Wgk)} C(gk); Sk Iql. k = 1,. . . , m 
EPA B(gk)l~(qlk)::-(CPlw,,.,.“,. ke IO 
(r) I41kl s; (41, ke 10 
(r) Ipl KKk = 1,. . . . m)gk + Sk((Wl (41 
where B(gt) is the boolean part and C(gt) the communication part of the guard 
gk (c(&) is skip if gk is purely boolean), IO is the set of indices of the input/output 
guards, and Cf’(g,) is the index of the process with which P, is trying to communicate 
in c(gk). ((S;)) wilt be present only if gk is an input or output guard. 
R8. Repetitive command 
(r) (PA kt, hk)] [otx: = 1,. . . , nl)gk + sk((s;))l {p} 
(r) {r}*[O(k=l,...,m)gk~Sk((S;)) p” i-&k) 
1 k-l I 
To simplify the presentation we assume that a loop terminates 
boolean parts of all the guards evaluate to false. 
only when the 
6. Failure of a process 
We now need to see how to obtain the behaviour of the failure prone execution 
of a process f, from the rules given above. Let [P,] denote such an execution of 
P,; [P,] then consists of a series of partial executions of P, which end in failure and 
re-making of P,, followed by a final and complete execution. (Note that any state 
reachable in [f’,] is a state that is reachable in some execution of P,.) The behaviour 
of [P,] can be defined by a rule. 
RlO. Failure prone process execution 
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Note that in general, h, in r:; and q2(,.o,n,-h, does not refer to the same sequence. 
This is because all predicates involved in the annotation of process P, are described 
in terms of a general but arbitrary sequence named h,. We could have written the 
fourth clause of RIO as 
where f(H) would be defined to be true if and only if the predicate I is satisfied 
for the sequence H. We have not adopted this notation since it would make the 
presentation of most of the other rules much more complicated. 
The second clause of RlO, q-q’. ensures that the results of the executions of 
[P,] that proceed to completion without encountering a failure satisfy [ P,]‘s post- 
condition. Similarly, the third clause of RlO, r-r’, ensures that those executions 
of [ P,] that proceed without encountering a failure satisfy [ P,]‘s execution invariant. 
The fourth implication ensures that the results of those executions of [f,] that 
encounter n + I failures before going through one fault free execution will satisfy 
the post-condition q’ provided the results of those executions of [ Pi] that encounter 
n failures satisfy q’. This may be seen as follows. 
Consider an execution of [ f’,] which encounters n + I failures, after each of which 
the process is re-made with its variables set to their initial values and (i, 0, 6) 
concatenated to !I~. When the final execution begins, the variables of f’, will have 
their initial values and the value of II, will have the form 
where /I’, is the record of communications that the process goes through during its 
jth partial execution. Let 11: be the sequence of communications by the process 
during its final execution, and let the final state of the local variables of the process 
be denoted by S/. Since after each failure, the local state of [ P,] is reset to its initial 
value, a possible execution of [F’,] would be one in which n (rather than n + I) 
failures were encountered, with the n + 1st execution proceeding without failure 
and reaching the same final state S!, and with its communication sequence being 
/lf^(i,O,S)-....h:“-(i,0,6)*h:. 
Thus the n-failure execution of [P,] is identical to the n + 1 -failure execution except 
that it avoids the first failure of that execution. Also, hl will satisfy r (i.e., rz’; will 
be true if /I: = h:). Then if the results obtained following the n-failure execution of 
[Pi] satisfy q’, and the second implication in RlO is true, the results obtained 
following a n + 1 -failure execution will also satisfy q’. The interpretation of the fifth 
clause of RIO is similar. 
A final remark is in order before concluding this section: it would appear that it 
should be possible to obtain the predicate r directly from the partial correctness 
post-condition q of P,, rather than by building it up during the proof of P,. One 
way of doing this would be to define 
r=3h:. [hdGq:l;l 
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and fo argue that any sequence h, that satisfies r must be the initial subsequence 
of some sequence h: that will satisfy 4. Recall, however, the example given earlier 
which indicates why a simple Hoare-style rule is inadequate for proving properties 
of fault tolerant programs. If P5 starts execution with the pre-condition h, = E, and 
no faults occur, we can obtain the post-condition h, = ((5,6.2)). r could then be 
r-=[h,=~vh=((5.6,2))]. 
Using this to derive the post-condition when faults do occur would give 
[V~l~sk~Jh,l.[h,[k]=(5,6,2)vh,[k]=(5,0,S)]]. 
This is incorrect, as some execution of P5 may choose the first guard, send I to P6, 
fail, recover (i.e. send 6 to PO), choose the next guard, send 2 to P6 and terminate. 
For such an execution of P,, we will have 
h, = ((5,6, 1X5,0, W5,6,2)) 
which does not satisfy the above post-condition. The problem, of course, is with 
the invariant for P5; the right invariant for P5 is r.(, where 
rs = [h, = E v h, = ((5. 6. I)) v 11, = ((5, 6, 2))] 
and using the rules presented in the last section we can prove 
(r.0 {hr = ~1 P5 (11, = ((5.6. 2))). 
Using the rule of the current section, we can then prove 
(4 (rnre1 [PSI {Y;}. 
where 
and 
4 = L&E ((5.6, 1>(5,0, N, (5,6,2)(5,0, W*c((5,6, I), (5.63, ~11 
Y; = [h, E I(5.6. 1X5,0, 6). (5,6,2X5,0, W*(5,6, '31. 
7. Parallel composition of fault tolerant processes 
R 1 1. Parallel composition 
(4) {p,Ah,=el [P,] {qtl, i=l,..., n 
i r:A Conzpar(h,,.. .,h,) q: A Compat( ht , . . . , II,) 
a-1 
The interesting aspect of this rule is that once the properties of fault prone 
processes, [P,], . . . , [P, ] are determined, they can be used to infer the property of 
their composition [ P,(I * . - (1 P.] without referring back to the processes P,, . . . , P.. 
This makes the proof system compositional in nature. 
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The definition of Compat is slightly different from that of [8]. to take care of the 
6 and p type elements that may appear in communication sequences: 
Compaf (II,,..., h,)=3h.[Vi,lSiSn, [hl,i=h,h[~j,l~jCn,ifj,R(hl~i,j)]]] 
where 
hl,i = the subsequence of all elements of h in which P, participates, i.e. 
actual communications between P, and P, (i.e. elements of the form 
(j, i, m) or (i. j, m), where m is not p or 6), failure/recovery of P, 
(i.e. elements of the form (i, 0, 6)). and observations by P, of a 
recovery by P, (i.e. elements of the form (j, i, p)), but not observa- 
tions by 5 of a recovery of P,. 
hl,i, j = the subsequence of all elements of h which correspond to communi- 
cation between P, and P,, and P, and P,,. 
Informally, 
R(h],i, j) E P,, informed of P,‘s faults and pl informed of P;s faults. 
Formally, 
R(Ir)=Vk. l<k<]lh(. 
The dclinition ensures that if P, has registered failure and recovery of I’, (recorded 
by (i, j, ,) as the kth element), P, must indeed have failed and recovcrcd (re- 
corded by a (i, 0, 8) as the k - lth element). Similarly, it ensures that if P, fails 
(recorded by a (i, 0,6)), then before Pi and P, can communicate with each other, 
4 must ‘register’ that P, had failed and recovered (recorded by a (i,j, p)). Note that 
even when a process P, fails several times before communicating with some other 
process P,, exactly one triple (i,j, p) will be appended to !I, when P, next attempts 
to communicaie with P,. As an example, if P, fails and then sends a value 3 to PI 
the various sequences will be as follows: 
h =((I, 0, W, 2, P)(L 2,3)). 
$1 = h, = ((I,& @(I, X3)), 
hl,2=hz=((1,2,p)(l,2,3)), 
hl,~.2=~1,0,~)(1,2,p)(i,2,3)), 
hl,L 1=~1*2,P)(l,2,3)). 
In ellect, RI1 specifies that if r: is the invariant of [P,] and qi its post-condition 
(i=l,..., n), then the assertion 8, A * . - A rk will hold during the execution of 
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[P*II -. * IIP”l. since these invariants r: have been shown to hold during the execution 
of [P,] (i=l,..., n), independently of what [P,], j f i, might do. Moreover, the 
communications recorded in the individual sequences must be mutually compatible 
at all times. Also when [ P,I] . . . llPn] finishes, not only will the post-conditions 
, 
41..e-7 q’, all hold, but also Compat (expressing the mutual compatibility of the 
communications recorded in the various sequences). Thus this rule is quite similar 
to the parallel composition rule of [S]. 
8. Non-terminating processes and programs 
The axioms and rules of the last three sections can be used to obtain the 
post-condition of fault tolerant programs; they can also be used to deal with 
non-terminating programs, such as the bounded buffer program given earlier. In 
this section we explain how we can use the approach of this paper to deal with 
such programs. 
Consider a fault tolerant program 
[PI II * . . IIplll 
Supposc for each of the processes P, (i = 1.. . . , n) we have shown, using the axioms 
and rules of the last section, the following results: 
If P, is a non-terminating process, q: will presumably be the predicateju!.ulse; however, 
we are interested not in the post-condition of P, (or of the other processes), but in 
the predicates it satisfies at certain points during its execution. Frequently, for 
instance, we are interested in the invariant relation that is satisfied by the variables 
of P, (in particular by its communication sequence h,) at all times during P,‘s 
execution. If each of the processes is non-terminating, as is often the case (as for 
the bounded buffer), we are usually interested in the invariant relation that the 
communication sequences of the various processes satisfy; in the case of.the bounded 
buffer we would probably like to prove that the lines produced by P, are received 
by PA in proper order, possibly with some repetitions, and that the number of 
repetitions is bounded by some function of the number of failures of the processes 
Pz and P,. 
The rule RI 1 of the last section allows us easily to arrive at the invariant 
r;~rih. * * A rk A Compat(h,, . . . , h,). 
In the next section, we show that the bounded bufTer program does indeed behave 
as we expect it to. The reader may recall that in the bounded buffer program we 
assumed that P, and P., do not fail; clearly, then, if we can prove 
(~~1 {h,=El 4 {q,}, i=l.... .4, 
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the appropriate invariant for the whole program, allowing for faults in P2 and P3 
but not in P, and Pa. would be 
r, A ri A r; A r1 A Cvmpat( h,, . . . , h,) 
rather than 
r; A ri A r; A r; A Compat( h, , . . , h,). 
In the next section we shall prove 
(r,) (h,=c} P, {j&e}, i= l,..., 4 
with appropriate r, (the post-condition is identically false as each of the processes 
is in an infinite loop), and show that 
[r,ArSAr;Ar,hCompat(h,,...,I~,)]~[T,~T~rrT,~T~] (3) 
where 
T, =Vk. 1 s ks-(h,l. {h,[k]~ ((3.4, p),(3,4, Line(m))}}, (4) 
that is 
Ir,E {(3,4, p), (3,4, Line(m))}*. 
Thus T, in (3) will csscntially show that the only ‘normal’ values the printer process 
P, will roccivc arc the ‘lines’. (Recall that f: prints all the normal values it recoivcs.) 
Tz = [t/k. I s k =s Ih,,l . { h_Jk 1 = (3, 4, /I)} 
v [3k. 15 k 5 Ilr.,l . (h.Jk] = (3,4, Lifw( 1)) 
AVk’. lsli’<:k.{h,[k’]=(3,4,,1)}}], (5) 
that is 
1I.I E {(3>4, P)I* 
or 
h.,,? (3,4,1~)}*(3,4, Line( 1)){3,4, p), (3,4, Line(m)>}*. 
T2 ensures that the first normal value that P., receives is Line(l) 
T,=V!i,k’. lcksk’slh,/. 
{ h,[ k] = (3,4, f.ine( m)) A h,[ k’] = (3,4, Line(m’)) 
-Vrn” . m < m” < m’. 
{3/L’. k’< k”< k. {hJk”] =(3,4, Line(m”))}}}. (6) 
T, ensures that if at some time t the mth line is printed and at a later time t’ the 
m’th line is printed then all lines from m + 1 to m’- 1 are printed between time t 
and t’ (possibly with duplications). 
T,~:/2(h,)~((n-l)*f,(h,) (7) 
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where 
f,(h2) = number of elements of the kind (2,0, 6) in h,, i.e., the number of 
failures of PZ, 
J( h,) = number of repetitions in elements of the kind (3,4, Line(m)) in h,. 
f,( h,) and fi( h,) can be formally defined in a straightforward manner and we leave 
that for the reader. Thus T, specifies an upper bound on the number of duplications 
in the lines printed; it is possible to get a tighter bound involving h,, h, and h,; 
however, this would be much more complex than T,, since it would involve the 
relative times at which Pz and P, failed (not just the number of failures of Pz and P,). 
With T,, T,, T, and T, as defined above, (3) will clearly show that the program 
does indeed behave as expected. 
9. Proof of the bounded buffer program 
Our proof of the bounded buffer program will be quite informal; we shall begin 
by proving the results 
(r,) {hi = E} Pi (j&e}, i= 1,. . . .4. (8) 
The formalization of these proofs (appealing to the various axioms and rules 
applicable to the statements in P,) will be left to the interested reader. Our informal 
arguments will be rather like the semi-formal proofs of sequential programs, omitting 
most of the intermediate details and all but the key assertions such as loop invariants; 
such informal proofs are justified since our formalism allows (or rather requires )us 
to consider one process at a time, and the validity of the various assertions in the 
proof of a process depends entirely on what the process does-and not at all on 
what the other processes do or on how they interact with this process or with each 
other. Thus once the intuition behind the proof rules is understood, it is as easy to 
informally prove results such as (8) as it is to informally prove the partial correctness 
of sequential programs. 
However, in the current case, we have to prove an additional result, after proving 
(8): 
[r,~r;hr;hr~1\Compat(h, ,..., ~,)]=s[T,AT~AT,AT~]. 
Let us begin by considering process P., since it is the simplest. The reader should 
easily be able to see the following result: 
(rJ {h, = e] P4 {MeI (9) 
where 
r, 5 t/k . 1 =S k S IU . {h.,[ kl E I(3,4, m), (3.4, P)] A m g {P, s]], (LO) 
that is 
h,E I(3.4, m), (3.4, P)]* 
(the loop invariant will be identical to r.,). 
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The post-condition in (9) merely expresses the fact that the loop does not 
terminate; r, will be true at all times during the execution of P4 since the only 
communications Pa participates in are those in which it receives an input from P3 
or a signal that P, has failed and recovered since the previous communication 
between P, and P.,. 
Next consider P,; the loop invariant for it is: 
LI,~h,EI(1,2,p),(l,2,(Line(m),m))}* 
A ready* nextline = Line(pseq + 1) 
A pseq = g,( h,) A sent = gz( h,) 
AVk. lsk~(h,l.[h,[k]=(l,2,(p,q)) 
*p=Line(q)Aq=g,(h,[l:k-l])+l] 
where 
g,(s) = 0, g*(E) =o 
g,(h ~‘(1,2,(p,q)))=gt(h)+l, g,(h -(1,2,(P,q)))=g2(h)+l. 
g,(~~*(l,2,p))=g,(h)-n~in(n,g,(~l)), g2(0.2.d)=0. 
The relation r, is 
r,=Vk. ISkS]fl,]. 
[~~,[kl =(I, 2, P> 
vh,[k]=(l,2,(Line(g,(h,[l:k-l])+l).g,(h,[l:k-l])+l))]. 
For readability and simplicity we will instead use the following relation for r,: 
r,=Vk. lSk9]h*] .[h,[k]=(l,2,(p.q)) 
*p= Line(q)hq =g,(h,[l: k- 1])+ I]. 
As stated earlier, we will leave it to the reader to formally verify (r,) {h, = 
E} P, {false}, using Lf, as the loop invariant, and introducing appropriate assertions 
as necessary. 
Next consider Pz for which we will only specify r2, leaving the other assertions 
including the loop invariant to the reader: 
r, = what P2 receives from P, is sent out to P, 
and the number of values received from P, but not sent to P, can be 
at most n-l. 
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where 
f,(h,]3) = sequence obtained from h,]3 by dropping from it all sub- 
sequences of the form ((2,3, m)(3,2, p)) for all m 
= h,/3 if in that execution there were no failures in P, 
= h,l3 in the execution of P2 where the fault alternative (( . . . )) 
has been removed, 
[ h]:;:.:::T; = sequence obtained from h by replacing simultaneously 
all occurrences of xi by e, for i = 1,. . . , n. 
More formally f,(hz]3) is defined as follows: 
f,(r) = F. f,((3,2, P) - h) =f,(h), 
~,((2,3,m)~(2,3,m’)~h)=(2,3,m)~j;((2,3,m’)~~) form,nr’fp, 
A((2.3, rrr) 73.2, P) - h) =j;(h). 
In writing down r:, we have allowed for failures in P3. but not in P, since P, is 
assumed not to fail; failures in Pz will be accounted for when we write down ri. 
We still need to consider P>. Again, we will only specify rlr leaving the formal 
verification of (r,,) (h, = E} P3 {Jdw} to the reader. First define 
/;({(*. *, (rn,, m2))}*, i) = retain only those triples (*, *, m,) whose second 
component values are in increasing order starting 
grcatcr than i. 
Note that the ditlerencc between Pi and the fault tolerant f’, given above is that 
some ‘evasive action’ is taken in the fault tolerant vcrison to compensate for possible 
failures in Pz. Then, /;(h,]2,0) of fault tolerant P, = 11~12 of Pi: 
f3 = [I1,~4]:::s/;(lr,~2.0) 
~~l~,I4l~lj;~~,1~,~~1~1~~,141+~1. 
More formally 
fJ(c i) = E, f,((2,3, P) A 11, i) =f,(h, i), 
/X(2,3, (m,, ml)) A h, i) = if m2 5 i thenfA( h, i) 
else (2.3, m,> -_L(h, mz). 
r, expresses the fact that [h,l4]5:j is a prefix of jJ h,( 2,0) and that the length of 
h, 14 can be at most 1 less than that of fJ( h, I2,O). 
That completes the informal proofs of 
(f,) {h, =E} P, {/ulse}, i= 1,. . .,4 
Before trying to prove 
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we write down ri and ri (from rz and r3 respectively): 
rl=Vk. 1 s ks Num(h2, 6)+ 1. {r,~:h.rq~hZ:k_,.46,) 
where 
Num( h,, x) = number of triples of the kind (j, i, x) in h,, 
subseq( h,, m 1, m2, x) = the subsequence of h, from just after the m lth element 
of h, of the form (j, i, x) (from the beginning of h, if 
m 1 = 0) to just before the m2th element of h, of the 
form (j, i, .x) (to the end of h, if m > Num(h,. x)). 
Essentially r; says that h: looks like a concatenation of a number of (smaller) 
sequences each of which satisfies r?, with a (2,0,6) element sandwiched between 
each consecutive pair of these smaller sequences. r; is similar: 
Proof of T,. From r, and rS we can infer that 
h,I1E((I,2,(Line(m), m))}*. 
This together with r; gives us 
jt,l2E ((2.3, (Line(m), m), (2.3, P)}* 
Combining this with r, we get 
/r,E {(3,4, Line(m)), (3,4, [I)}*. 0 
Proof of T2. From r, and ri we know that 
ir21 3 E {(2,3, (LW 11, 1 NO, 2, P), (3,2, P)}* 
{(2,3, (f.ine( l), 1))(2,3, (Line(2), 2))} A some arbitrary trace. 
Combining this with r\ gives us 
h, 14 E (3.4, Line( 1)) A some arbitrary trace 
and hence 
h.,~ ((3.4, p)}*(3,4, Line( 1)) A some arbitrary trace. 0 
Proof of 7’,. From r, and r; we obtain 
Vk.1~kk~h2].{h2[k]=(1.2,(Line(m),m))~m>1 
~3k’.k’<k.{h,[k’]=(1,2,(Line(m-l),m-1)) 
~hJk’+l:k-l]l1~{(1,2,(Line(p),p))}* 
where p b m}}. 
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Combining this with r; gives us 
Vk. 1 s k s IhJ. {h,[k] = (2,3, (f.ine( m), m)) A m > 1 
+3k’.k’<k.{h,[k’]=(2,3,(fhte(m-l),m-1)) 
A h,[k’+ 1: k - 1112~ ((2.3, (Line(p). p)), (2,3, P)]* 
where p 2 m}}. 
From the above and r, we can infer that 
Vk. 1 s ks(h,j. {h,[k]=(3,4, Line(m))~ m> 1 
*Elk’. k’<k.{h,[k’]=(3,4, Line(m-1)) 
A h,[ k’+ 1: k - l] E {(3,4, Line(p)), (3,4, p)}* 
where p 5 m}}. 
which can be rewritten as 
Vk, k’ . 1 s k c k’s IhJ. 
{h,[ k] = (3, 4, Line( nt)) A h4[ k’] = (3.4, he(nt’)) 
*t/m” . m<m”<nt’.{3k”. k’<k”<k 
. {h,[k”] =(3,4, Line(m”))}}}. Cl 
Proof of T,. From r, WC obtain 
number of repetitions in h,] 2~ (n - 1) * number of failures of P2. 
Combining this with rl we get 
number of repetitions in h2(3 6 (n - I) * number of failures of Pz 
+ number of failures of 4. 
From the above and r; we get 
number of repetifions in h,j45Z(n - I) * number of failures of f2. 
Since 
number of repetitions in 11~14 = number of repetitions in h, 
we have proved T,. Cl 
10. Discussion 
The proof rules defined here provide a means for formally proving the properties 
of fault tolerant programs written in extended CSP and executing on a distributed 
system whose nodes may fail. They are naturally more complex than proof rules 
for programs that execute on totally reliable hardware but, with some fami1iarit.y. 
their interpretation becomes no more complicated than the task of constructing fault 
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tolerant programs. The difficulty of writing correct, fault tolerant programs is easily 
underestimated and, during the course of this work we found that the exercise of 
conducting formal proofs often revealed errors in programs that earlier passed 
through fairly thorough but informal inspection. 
The proof system proposed in this paper is compositional in nature; that is it is 
possible to derive the specification of a construct purely from the specification of 
its components. 
A criticism that may be directed at our proof system is that the parallel composition 
rule combines all the processes at once; rather than, say, two at a time. This is not 
so much due to our formalism, as it is to the CSP framework in which one cannot 
combine two processes to obtain a new process. It is possible, using the same 
intuition as that underlying the system of this paper, to construct a proof system in 
which processes can be bound together two at a time if that is reasonable in the 
underlying framework. Since binding processes in pairs does not seem reasonable 
in CSP, we did not attempt to do this in the current paper. 
The rules are limited to proofs of partial correctness and it is tempting to consider 
how they may be extended to deal with total correctness. For example, if it can be 
proved that all loops will terminate, the function C’orrrpar can be extended to detect 
deadlock and to prove process termination. Unfortunately, proof of loop termination 
cannot in general be done in isolation and requires re-inspection of the proof outlines 
of all processes. This militates against the basic intention of this proof system that 
once the proofs of individual processes are over, proof of the program should 
directly result from the application of the rule of parallel composition. The possibility 
of carrying forward loop termination predicates in post-conditions and proving their 
‘compatibility’ at the end must be rejected because it results in extremely unwieldy 
proofs. So the proof system remains one of partial correctness. 
It is important to prove that the axiomatic system is consistent and complete with 
respect to an operational model for extended CSP. Though we shall not attempt to 
demonstrate this here, the proof given in [Y] for the system of [S] can be adapted 
for our version of extended CSP. 
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that a process executing on a failed 
node is restarted from its initial state. Such an assumption allows the possibility of 
running the system of processes using read only stable storage [S]. If checkpoints 
of processor states are stored, a process can be restarted from a more recent state 
than its initial state. This will require the usage of stable storage but it may at times 
simplify the recovery action required. Checkpoints can be handled by suitably 
altering axiom RIO for Failure Prone Process Execution. 
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